All happy families resemble one another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.
--Leo Tolstoy
Tolstoy's epigrammatic comparison of families is not as far removed from research on innovative, high-technology clusters as one might expect. We contend that existing studies of innovation and propinquity all too often begin with Tolstoy's insight; that successful regions resemble one another, while those that falter do so more idiosyncratically. This conjecture, however, is rarely an a priori proposition. Instead, we suggest it is a substantive artifact of reliance on methods that emphasize comparative statics over analyses that focus on emergence and dynamics.
Recent efforts illustrate the need for closer focus on both the genesis and evolutionary trajectories of regional high-technology clusters (Breschi and Malerba 2001) . New attention is being turned to both the origins of regional networks and variations in their capacity with an eye toward understanding the necessary inputs for cluster formation, as well as the inital conditions that shape their trajectories (Bresnahan, Gambardella, and Saxenian 2001) . Indeed, studies that link entrepreneurship during times of crisis to regional characteristics and capacities open the possibility that very similar outcomes may emerge from widely disparate processes (Feldman 2001) .
Such a claim reverses the causal order implied by static comparisons that treat the characteristics of successful regions as foregone outcomes of similar processes. In what follows, we offer a thought experiment that highlights the very different trajectories followed by two successful high-technology regions. Drawing upon a dataset that tracks strategic alliance networks in human therapeutic and diagnostic biotechnology over a twelve-year period (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , we examine patterns in the development of two canonically successful biotechnology clusters in the Boston/Cambridge Massachusetts metropolitan region and the San Francisco Bay Area. We emphasize the extent to which interesting variations in the form and substance of innovative activity are apparent when viewed with a dynamic lens. Broad similarities in ascendant clusters, we contend, can be outcomes of divergent patterns of development. Moreover, we suggest that these patterned variations can shape the nature of innovations produced by firms.
Our empirical analyses proceed from a trio of analytic staring points. One, network structure and co-location are necessary characteristics of clusters. Successful high-tech clusters are not merely jumbled congeries of organizations, resources, and skills; they require both propinquity and cohesion (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004) . Two, inter-organizational networks are simultaneously the locus of innovation in biotechnology (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996) and the skeleton on which the varied institutional and social arrangements that support innovation interact (Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005) . Three, the form and substance of innovation in successful clusters vary over time and with patterns of emergence (K. Porter 2004) . In short, understanding how successful clusters generate substantive novelty requires attention to the dynamics of the networks that weave small, science-based biotechnology companies, investors, and nonprofit research organizations into a coherent regional 'community.'
In the sections that follow we turn to descriptive data to highlight variations in the trajectories and outcomes of two key biotechnology regions. We first introduce the biotechnology industry and the regions that are our substantive focus. Next we turn to description and discussion of the inter-organizational networks that underpin innovation in both clusters. Variations in the evolution of those networks, we contend, are consequential precisely because they leave lasting impacts on the form and substance of innovations by the firms that are embedded in them. In order to flesh out this claim, we draw on patent citation data to establish that the forms innovation takes differ by region.
Boston and Bay Area biotechnology innovations depend upon distinct sets of antecedents and rely to disparate degrees on internal R&D.
Next, we draw upon FDA approval data to demonstrate differences in the substantive focus of successful innovations by biotechnology firms in Boston and the Bay Area. We conclude with a comparison of the patents and citations underlying two successful treatments for remitting and relapsing multiple sclerosis: Betaseron, developed
by Bay Area firm Chiron, which was approved in 1993 and Avonex, developed by
Boston stalwart Biogen, which received FDA approval in 1996. The therapies are direct competitors as they share an initial therapeutic indication, rely on extremely similar biological compounds and have been the subject of several comparative clinical trials.
Yet the patented innovations that support each therapeutic rely on only partially overlapping sets of precursors. These intellectual antecedents, we suggest, reflect lasting distinctions between the topology, infrastructure, and culture of the regions in which the firms developed these comparable products.
The San Francisco Bay area and Cambridge/Boston are the world's largest and most commercially successful biotechnology regions. The attributes and successes of these regions are widely studied and their efforts broadly emulated. Despite similarities in scale and outcomes, however, each region emerged through a distinctive process that continues to influence its outputs. These variations, in turn, suggest that there are multiple pathways to similar outcomes and offer a corrective to efforts to transpose a 'standard' model of regional innovative success that may never have existed.
Regional Advantage and Industrial Development in Biotechnology 1
We focus on the commercial field of biotechnology, which developed scientifically in university labs in the 1970s, saw the founding of hundreds of small science based firms in the 1980s, and matured in the 1990s with the release of dozens of new therapeutics. The field is notable for both its scientific and commercial advances as well as for the diverse cast of organizational players --universities and other public research organizations (PROs) government laboratories, venture capital firms, large multi-national pharmaceutical corporations, and smaller dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) -involved in its development.
In this field, where the sources of scientific and technical leadership are widely dispersed and rapidly developing, and where the relevant skills and resources necessary to produce new medicines are scattered, collaboration among organizations became a necessary component of success. An elaborate system of private governance emerged to orchestrate the inter-organizational networks such collaborations constituted (Powell 1990; , and the internal structure and practices of DBFs changed accordingly as firms co-evolved with the structures that characterize the industry.
During the very early years of the industry, from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, most DBFs were very small start-ups that relied, of necessity, on external support.
Lacking the skills and resources needed to bring new innovations to market, they became involved in elaborate lattices of relationships with universities and large pharmaceutical firms (Kenney 1986; Powell and Brantley 1992) . Lacking a knowledge base in the new scientific field of molecular biology (which was the industry's wellspring), large companies were drawn to start-ups by the latter's capabilities in basic and translational science (Galambos and Sturchio 1996; Gambardella 1995) . Asymmetries in technological, regulatory, and financial muscle drove early collaborative patterns in the industry (Hagedoorn and Roijakkers 2002; McKelvey 1996; Orsenigo 1989; Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni 2001) .
Despite arguments that the new field would undergo a 'shake-out' as large pharmaceutical firms developed the technical competencies that would allow them to assert dominance over weaker small firm partners (Sharpe 1991; Teece 1986 ), the founding of new firms accelerated. Established firms' efforts to 'cherry-pick' promising new ventures faced significant obstacles imposed by deeply collaborative R&D efforts and a mobile scientific labor force. Instead of consolidation and shakeout, the industry's later years witnessed the give-and-take and mutual forbearance characteristic of relational contracting (Macneil 1978) , which became the dominant practice in the field.
By the late 1980s, several DBFs (e.g. Biogen, Genzyme, Chiron, Genentech, Amgen, Immunex) had become large and formidable organizations in their own right, and numerous pharmaceutical firms had created in-house molecular biology research programs (Henderson and Cockburn 1996; Zucker and Darby 1997) . Even when mutual need declined as a spur to collaboration, the pattern of dense inter-connection deepened, suggesting that the original motivation of exchanging complementary resources had shifted to a broader focus on mining innovation networks to explore new forms of collaboration and product development ).
An analytic story that places networks alone at the heart of biotechnology's development misses an important component of the story, however. Despite the evolution of dense and expansive networks, geography played an essential role in the industry's development and remains an important feature even today. The evidence for salutory effects of geographic concentration in high-technology industries is compelling.
Studies drawing on multiple methods and data sources have demonstrated the positive effects of propinquity in high technology regions (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Audretsch and Stephan 1996; Feldman and Audretsch 1998; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993; Prevezer 1997; Zucker and Darby 1996) , and the U.S. biotechnology industry is no exception. The most basic unit of a network is the dyad. In this case, a dyad is a pair of organizations connected by a formal R&D, finance, licensing, or commercialization tie. Boston represents a case where a network grew from origins in the public sector (Porter, Bunker Whittington & Powell, 2005) . Put differently, public science formed the foundation for commercial application (Nelson 1981 (Nelson ,1986 . Industries where commercially viable technical advances emerge from academic and public sector roots manifest more open technological trajectories than industries that rely more heavily on industrial R&D (Dosi 1982) . The Boston biotechnology community is linked by shared connections to public research organizations early in its evolution. These connections remain an important part of the network, but increasing patterns of DBF to DBF and DBF to VC ties reflect the development of a commercial network that becomes structurally autonomous, while bearing the imprint of the public sector. 
The form and substance of regional innovation.
How do varied starting points and evolutionary trajectories leave lasting imprints on regional innovation patterns? We contend that the networks more clearly dominated by 'open' public sector organizations will result in innovations that rely less heavily on internal R&D, and that draw more on research conducted in organizations other than biotechnology firms. In short, we expect patents assigned to Bay Area DBFs, a region whose network was always based more on commercial firms to cite proportionally less non-DBF prior art and to rely more heavily on self citations than do patents assigned to Boston firms.
We turn to data on citations made by patents assigned to Boston and Bay Area DBFs to examine how regional effects may shape the process of innovation. We begin by presenting information on the R&D outputs of regional firms in the aggregate from 1988-1999. We then turn to consideration of shifting patterns in prior art citations by DBF patents. Next we consider the substance of regional innovation by assessing differences in rates of FDA approvals, as well as variation on Orphan Drug Indications 10 by region. Finally, we compare the patented innovations underpinning two comparable treatments for multiple sclerosis: Cambridge-based Biogen's Avonex and Emeryvillebased Chiron's Betaseron.
The differences in regional scale that we identify are matched by differences in the volume of innovation. Table 1 presents a comparison of R&D outputs by region for the period 1988-1999. The 82 Bay Area DBFs in our sample generated some 3,800 U.S. utility patents in this time period; which is an average of slightly more than 46 patents per firm. This contrasts dramatically with Boston DBFs' average of slightly more than 24 patents per firm. In contrast, biotechnology firms located outside of these two regions produced only slightly more than 14 patents on average, suggesting the relative fecundity of both Bay Area and Boston DBFs.
These output differences also mask a highly skewed distribution of patents within regions. Bay Area outputs are more stratified than those in Boston. The five most prolific Bay Area patentors account for 63% of regional patents, while the top five Boston patentors were issued 42% of the region's patents. Despite these patterns, patents assigned to regional firms had very similar citation impact. Two-tailed t-tests discerned no significant difference between the impact of Bay Area and Boston DBF patents (t=0.774, p=0.439), but did suggest that firms in these regions higher impact intellectual property than those located elsewhere (t=3.837, p<.0001). 11 The similar impact of Boston and Bay Area innovations masks broad differences in the distribution of highly cited patents within the regions. Patents assigned to Boston firms manifest a much higher variance in forward citations than do Bay Area patents, suggesting that Boston firms may more routinely engage in 'exploratory' innovative search, which typically yields a few very high impact patents at the expense of numerous innovations with lower than average future effects (Fleming and Sorenson 2001; Leavitt and March 1988) . On this view, the Bay Area's lower citation variance is indicative of a more directed and incremental 'exploitative' strategy, which is what one might expect of firms that are supported by investor networks that are interested in demonstrable progress. Firms that pursue exploitative strategies generally develop numerous related improvements on established components of their research trajectories. Such incremental innovations are less valuable on average than the riskier outcomes of more broad-ranging innovation efforts, but convey important benefits in terms of overlapping ownership rights. Exploitative patents, then, will have lesser variance in their impacts than will patents that result from more exploratory efforts to develop blockbuster technologies.
[ Table 1 here]
While differences in impact variation are suggestive of different patterns of search in innovation, patterns in the prior art citations provide more direct insight into the precursors that firms rely on in developing new intellectual property. Such 'backward' citation data allows us to expand upon the relationship between regional networks and innovation in biotechnology.
Consider two ideal-typical possibilities: (1) Firms embedded in networks composed largely of competitors and investors are primarily concerned with speed and with commercial development, hence they pursue a more focused innovation process that relies heavily on internal R&D and attention to the efforts of direct competitors (e.g.
other DBFs). As they are embedded in networks that lack a significant PRO involvement, such firms may be less likely to rely heavily upon innovations developed externally. In contrast, (2) firms that are embedded in networks anchored by public research organizations and that lack strong investor involvement may feel somewhat less overt pressure to pursue immediate commercial returns. Firms, Alza and Genentech. Again, these early approvals reflect the commercialization strategy pursued in a region with a strong venture capital community.
Eighteen (18) Philadelphia's Centocor, and Seattle's Immunex account for much of the action. In terms of market outcomes, the Bay Area appears to be both quicker and more prolific than Boston and both regions represent concentrations of success. This outcome is to be expected given a more commercially focused network and a development-oriented strategy that relies heavily on internal R&D. Indeed, 17 of the first twenty of these drugs to come to market were produced by Bay Area firms.
These differences in market outcomes, though, are much more suggestive of variations in strategy and focus than of competency. Consider another source of information about the development of therapeutics, Orphan drug designations. The 1983
Orphan Drug Act was designed to enable the FDA to speed the development of therapies for rare diseases, and orphan designations offer tax breaks and regulatory assistance to organizations that develop such medicines. One hundred and eleven (111) Betaseron is based on research done by Cetus, an Emeryville, CA biotech firm that was acquired by Chiron, another Berkeley-based DBF. Chiron did the development work on Betaseron and shepherded the drug through the FDA approval process.
Betaseron is manufactured and marketed under an arrangement with Berlex Laboratories, an American subsidiary of the pharmaceutical firm Schering-Plough. Avonex, in contrast is based on research done by Boston-based Biogen who also developed, manufactures and markets the drug. We use FDA labeling information to identify the patents that underpin these drugs. We then turned to the NBER patent citation database to trace prior art citations by those patents and identify the sources of such prior art. In both instances we trace precursor inventions to three generations. Table 2 presents summary data for the innovations underlying these two drugs.
[ Table 2 here]
The patterns suggested by Table 2 are in line with the overall results in prior art citations by region, and with our expectations based on the evolution of each cluster's network. Betaseron relies on a set of four related patents initially assigned to Cetus (three were re-assigned to Chiron following the merger of the two firms; the fourth, a process patent for producing interferon, was re-assigned to Berlex Labs). These four patents cite a small group of prior art patents (4). Those four 'first-generation' precursors make another 31 second generation citations and those cite a further 16 linkages to prior art. All told, then, Betaseron rests upon a history of some 55 interlocking patents. Avonex, which is based on a single compound patent, reaches more broadly into the prior art, relying on 155 separate pieces of intellectual property. None of the prior art on which Avonex depends is owned by Biogen. This last finding is particularly telling, as it suggests that Biogen developed its market leading therapeutic without the benefit of a thicket of intellectual property rights, relying instead on a mix of partner's intellectual property and public domain science.
Differences in these two citation networks are instructive. Betaseron's underlying IP network includes six patents developed by Cetus. Avonex, in contrast, relies on a single Biogen-owned patent that makes no citations to other intellectual property owned by that firm. While internal R&D was surely not sufficient to the development of Betaseron, that drug relied much more heavily on a single DBF's research effort than did its competitor. Both innovation networks reach well beyond the regions in which the two firms are situated. Betaseron cites only two patents held by other Bay Area organizations, but it is notable that both are biotechnology firms (Genentech and ICN).
The Avonex citation network, in contrast, cites four patents held by Boston organizations, but none are owned by DBFs. Three belong to public research organizations with whom Biogen has network ties (MIT holds two patents the Massachusetts General Hospital a third). The fourth belongs to a non-DBF firm, a purification company called Ionics.
While the citation networks are fairly small, comparing these two very similar drugs offers a natural experiment that holds constant important technical, clinical and regulatory features of biotechnology innovations. Even when such factors are very similar, the patent citation networks underlying these two drugs differ in a fashion that reflects aggregate differences in regional innovation patterns and expectations based on the inter-organizational networks that characterize each region. The Bay Area-based drug relies more heavily on internal R&D and on the research efforts of other DBFs. In contrast, the Boston-based therapy draws on a broader cross-section of past IP owned by a wider range of organizational types.
Conclusion and Implications.
The Boston and Bay Area biotech communities became more similar over the 12 year period under examination, shedding their respective reliance on PROS and VCs, and developing a strong firm to firm component. But these divergent roots have a notable impact on the innovation process, with Boston-based companies heavily reliant on external sources of knowledge, opting to favor more exploratory efforts at discovery.
This signature is captured by our measures of patent volume and impact, and by patterns of patent citations. Bay Area biotech firms were more self-reliant in terms of knowledge generation and more persistent in their efforts to further development of in-house intellectual property.
Similarly, Bay Area firms were faster and more prolific in terms of new product development, as well as more likely to pursue novel medicines for larger markets where they might face stiff competition. In contrast, Boston firms were more deliberative in their commercial strategies and more likely to focus on medicines for identifiable and active patient populations in need of relief from specific illnesses. Most remarkably, these differences persisted even when we held constant market, scientific and regulatory factors by examining Chiron and Biogen's approaches to the development of similar treatments for multiple sclerosis. Clearly, the continuing impact of venture capital in the Bay Area and public research organizations in Boston is significant.
We lack data on the early scientific roots of technical advance in the life sciences in Boston and the Bay Area. Perhaps the patterns we have observed are the outcroppings of diverse academic approaches to scientific research in the life sciences. Boston is home to the remarkable institutional combination of MIT, a powerful basic science institution that lacks a medical school, Harvard, another powerhouse institution in basic science whose medical school is located across the Charles river at a considerable remove from the main campus, and a number of research-oriented hospitals and institutes. The upshot of this institutional mix appears to us to be a corporate focus on expansive science and on patients. In contrast, the biotech community in the Bay Area has its earliest origins in the 'marriage' of Herbert Boyer, a UCSF scientist, and Robert Swanson, a prominent venture capitalist, who joined together to create Genentech, one of the very first biotech companies.
UCSF is an unusual institution, lacking disciplinary departments and a full panopoly of research program and students. The organizational model at UCSF was an inter-disciplinary, cross-functional approach to medicine, with an emphasis on translating basic science into clinical application (Varmus and Weinberg 1992) . Genentech adopted and refined this interdisciplinary 'team' model, adding the impatience and restlessness of venture capital financiers and the attendant focus on 'swinging for the fences' by developing products for such major illnesses as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes. Here, an approach to translational R&D pioneered at an elite PRO is transferred by founding scientists to a region's leading firm, eventually becoming a dominant arrangement for the region. The co-evolution of innovation, strategy, and structure. The paradoxical roles public research organizations play in the industrial and technological development of regions are illuminated by a joint focus on the evolution of structures (in this case regionally bounded inter-organizational networks), organizational strategies (approaches to product development and commerce), and patterns of innovation (differential reliance upon expansive and streamlined R&D logics). Tracing the emergence and dynamics of regional structures provides new insights into firm-level arrangements and strategies, but those strategies help to reproduce the landscapes that generated them. This coevolutionary dynamic is suggestive of important sources of regional variation, but also highlights the potential consequences of organizational action in evolving networks. Co-evolution and the perils of emulation. The contrast of Boston and the Bay Area, the most prolific biotechnology clusters in the world, should give pause to policy makers who look to successful clusters for models to emulate. Without awareness of underlying institutional variations and distinctive approaches to the development of new medicines, one could easily draw the incorrect inference that combining public research organizations, venture capital and small firms provides the ultimate recipe for successful economic development. We emphasize that similar approaches may be very deceiving and mask sharp differences in underlying causes of institutional and technical development. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 DBF VC DBF PRO DBF DBF The within-region cites for Avonex are to PROs (Mass Gen (1) MIT(2)) and a non-dbf firm (Ionics)
